



**Settlement of the Kurdish
Problem in Iraq
Kurdish Democratic Party's
PARTICIPATION IN
GOVERNMENT**

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Late in 1972, "Ath-Thawra" -central organ of the Arab Baath Socialist Party (ABSP) -carried a series on the serious obstacles impeding the implementation of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish problem and jeopardizing relations between the ABSP and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

Meanwhile, the paper presented constructive proposals for surmounting difficulties to speed up the implementation of the March Manifesto (This is the agreement on the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish problem announced by the Revolution Command Council on March 11, 1970) and for restoring the alliance between the two parties on the basis of allegiance to the sovereignty and unity of the country and the dedication to the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people and to genuine and fruitful cooperation for building a flourishing progressive Iraq.

"Ath-Thawra" ventured upon running that series, which disclosed serious facts and figures that aroused deep alarm and concern both inside and outside the country, with the aim of enriching the dialogue then under way between the two parties and promoting it to the standard of the serious challenges facing the country. Indeed the situation in northern Iraq had presented a mounting danger at a time when the imperialist-Zionist alliance had been escalating its conspiracies against the Arab homeland. It was, therefore, inevitable to call upon the people "To Safeguard Peace and Consolidate National Unity" as mentioned in the title of the series.

Another important motive for publishing those articles was the need to acquaint the people with the real situation in order to further the new democracy, which has now developed into a popular National and Nationalist Progressive Front (NNPF) guided by an agreed upon National Action Charter, enjoying the full support of the overwhelming majority of the people, and implemented in Iraq to enable the masses to play their decisive role in overcoming all difficulties and defending the aims and gains of the July 17 Revolution.

As a matter of fact, "Ath-Thawra" series meant to champion the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people as specified in the March Manifesto, which had been unanimously supported by the people. It also confessed shortcomings on the part of state and ABSP organs and welcomed constructive criticism.

While accentuating the necessity for full understanding and confidence as well as sincere cooperation between the ABSP and the KDP, the paper dealt with the nature and mission of the alliance between the two parties. It stressed the progressive essence of the alliance and showed how it could be revived so that the Kurdish movement could shoulder its responsibility in the development and progress of the entire country. In the light of practical experience, the paper pointed out how the KDP assumed the role of the "opposition" instead of acting as a faithful ally and referred to the reactions created by this contradiction.

Dealing with reciprocal commitments under the March Manifesto, "Ath-Thawra" held a

ATH- THAWRA"

Lately, talks began between representatives of the Arab Baath Socialist Party (ABSP) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to study the problems and obstacles encumbering the progress of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question and marring relations between the two parties.

These talks are characterized by frankness and explicitness. It is indeed our belief that telling the whole truth to the masses and acquainting them with all points of views pertaining to the difficulties and matters at issue, will greatly help bring these talks to a successful end. This will also help elevate the talks to the serious standard dictated by the nature of past experience and by the imperialist and reactionary menace converging on the homeland and on its militant national and nationalist forces. Furthermore, such an attitude will, eventually, promote the talks to a mature level that is compatible with the magnitude of the general responsibilities entrusted to both parties.

Hence, keeping the people informed of all developments is a pre-requisite to enabling them play their natural role in maintaining peace, cementing national unity and in defending their progressive and democratic gains.

In our estimation, discussing the Kurdish question, under all circumstances and on all occasions, is always useful; it is rather imperative. This fact remains valid whether the atmosphere is shrouded with clouds of passivity or bright with rays of positive ness. The Kurdish question was, and still is, one of our most outstanding national problems and, therefore, deserves perpetual study and analysis. The very nature of the development of this question and its concomitant host of complications and conjunctures, before and after the March 11th Manifesto calls for more of this attention.

We take this opportunity to admit that, since the declaration of the March Manifesto, we have not treated the question and its pertaining complexities and surroundings in the required scope-contrary to what the masses expected, and insisted upon.

However, it may be good to remind that, prior to the declaration of the March Manifesto, we flanged our doors wide open for the discussion of the Kurdish question, expounded our views quite frankly, projected the obstacles that hindered attaining a peaceful and democratic settlement of the problem and published the gist of the dialogue between our Party and the KDP ...reminding of all this, we still find ourselves obliged to explain, now, the reasons that prompted taking such a stand, which contradicted our conviction of the permanent need for open exchange of opinions and overtures regarding all national issues, so that the masses could give the first and final judgment on them.

Excluding limited exceptions impelled by certain circumstances and attitudes, we have observed what amounted to silence since the long period that followed the announcement of the March Manifesto. The point was to put to the test an idea shared by numerous nationalist forces and personalities their argument was this:

"The party leading power should always maintain wisdom, forbearance and long magnitude. The conjunctures and complications inherent in the Kurdish question demand a special consideration and a special treatment. Therefore, exchanging opinions through newspapers, however important and useful, is apt, in many cases, to create confusion, complicate matters and to retard the bona fide efforts exerted for the smooth navigation of the ship of the peaceful and democratic solution to the shores of safety.

Frankly speaking, a more than two and a half years' trial of that opinion proved it to be invalid. On the one hand, abiding by that idea was one-sided- by the ABSP solely. For al-Taakhi, the KDP newspaper never ceased to pose what it considered as negativism, problems and obstructions hindering the attainment of the settlement.

Besides, the publications of the KDP similarly dealt with the same subjects. All this was, of course, an expression and interpretation of the attitude of one party-the KDP.

On the other hand, information media abroad also never ceased to talk about problems facing the Kurdish question. Some of the material they circulated related to cases that actually took place and to statements attributed to leading sources in the KDP; and some were sheer fabrications and lies.

This material (authentic or concocted, quoting real or false sources, forged or true) expressed opinions and attitudes contrary to those of the ABSP and the revolutionary government.

All this motley information found its way, in full or in parcel, to citizens across newspapers, publications and broadcasting services. It created, and still creates, a vast state of confusion, impairing constructive endeavors for a just settlement far from contributing to pave their way. In the wake of this eventful experience, it became evident that candid exchange of opinions does help the elimination of confusion and the elucidation of facts- provided this exchange originates from devotion to the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question and from a genuine desire to solve all other problems in a fraternal spirit springing out of a deep belief in national unity.

In our opinion, any talk, however frank and far-reaching, should not deviate, in form or substance, from the following principles:

1. Absolute faith in the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people within the framework of the Iraqi Republic and Arab-Kurdish brotherhood.
 2. Absolute faith in the letter and spirit of the March Manifesto, and adherence to it under all circumstances and conditions.
 3. Dedication to the maintenance of maximum understanding and cooperation between the ABSP and the KDP in the sphere of bilateral relations and in common activity within the framework of the 'National Front' -as advocated and specified by the 'National Action Charter'.
- Should these principles illuminate their path, any deliberations will surely be positive, at least in their intentions.

On our part, we should like to emphasize not only our positive intentions but also the fact that any idea expressed by us is but a contribution and a point of view presented for scrutiny and discussion. We should also like to affirm that we are always ready to correct any fault committed by us, be it in theory or practice, in order to serve the public interest and the cause of this homeland and its militant people.

SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM IN IRAQ

Discussion and documents on the peaceful and Democratic settlement of the problem

Article 2

WHAT IS THE MARCH MANIFESTO?

More than two and a half years have now elapsed since the declaration of the March Manifesto. During that period, a lot has been written and said about the Manifesto, not only in Iraq but also in the Arab region and in the world at large. Nevertheless, we think it may be useful to pose this question:

What is the March Manifesto?

Raising this question should not imply that the Manifesto is ambiguous and needs explanation. Nor should it mean an attempt to give a new explanation to the Manifesto in the light of the happenings of the last two and a half years.

The idea is only to set a basic criterion, or a number of basic criteria, to which all should refer when viewpoints differ and when interpretations conflict. To this aim must be added a fact that is unavoidable to admit, namely: the political realities of our country and of the Kurdish question in particular, always necessitate emphasizing axiomatic matters.

Then, what is the March Manifesto?

The elucidation we present here expresses our concept of the Manifesto before it was declared, at the time of its declaration, after its declaration and in future too.

This concept, in our opinion, formed the basis of the dialogue that passed among us and the leadership of the Kurdish Movement and the KDP before the declaration of the Manifesto. We also hold that our understanding of the Manifesto is identical to that reached by the Iraqi nationalist, national and progressive forces and by progressive friendly forces throughout the World.

To cut a long story short, we can sum up our concept of the March Manifesto in the following: The March Manifesto is a political document vide which the revolutionary authority binds itself before the people to realize the national legitimate rights of the Kurdish people, including self-rule, within the framework of the Iraqi Republic and to achieve the equitable and full participation of the Kurdish people in all the affairs of the country.

On the other side, the document requires the Kurdish Armed Movement and the KDP, both led by Mr. Mustafa al-Barzani, to end the exceptional conditions that prevailed before the declaration of the Manifesto, together with concomitant effects, manifestations and establishments.

It also requires functioning on the basis of the unity of the homeland, the country's constitution and legal institutions, the alliance between the ABSP and KDP and consultation between the two parties."

Immediately after the announcement of the Manifesto, on March 3, 1970, the leadership of the Kurdish Movement and the KDP announced their support to it and declared, before the people, their commitment to honor their part of the liabilities and responsibilities as stipulated by the Manifesto.

Therefore, one can say that the March Manifesto is comprised of these two very closely interlinked basic issues:

Guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Kurds.

Strengthening the unity of Iraq, that is, the unity of the people, the homeland and of the constitutional system in accordance with the logic of the supremacy of law and centralization of authority.

Thus, the Manifesto included certain responsibilities to be carried out by the Iraqi government alone and others to be shouldered by the Kurdish Movement and the KDP alone. In addition, it contained common responsibilities to be carried out by the two parties together, within the framework of joint action and mutual full adherence to peace and national unity.

It is common knowledge that the enforcement of the clauses of the Manifesto is no easy task.

Many difficulties, problems and differences, naturally, stand in the way of this task. This is a reality that existed during the last two and a half years that followed the declaration of the Manifesto, and that continues to exist now. Therefore, it must neither be denied nor concealed.

The responsibilities entrusted to the government solely are tied up, in one form or another, with those bestowed on the Kurdish Movement and the KDP, and vice versa. There are, too, the tasks whose implementation requires joint action by both parties. All, and each, of these matters involve many interpretations, complications and varying viewpoints.

That this is a tangible and agonizing fact, should not give rise to despair or lead us into a wilderness. However complicated the interpretations and disagreements might be certain guiding basic criteria will always remain valid and handy. They can safely be relied upon in the judgment of failure and success and retreat and progress in all spheres.

We think that the principal criterion for measuring what had actually been realized from the targets of the Manifesto during the past phase, together with the targets that ought to be achieved now or tomorrow, is an objective and honest comparison between the commitments being attained by the authority of the Revolution and those being accomplished by the leadership of the Kurdish Movement and the KDP.

This is the really objective and fair criterion, we believe because it emanates from the substance of the March Manifesto itself and from the nature of the peaceful and democratic settlement to the Kurdish question whose success, needless to remind, is everybody's responsibility.

Should we be obliged to enumerate, today, the commitments we have honored, this must not be construed as an act of boasting or as cornering the other side in a state of dereliction. Our intention is, simply, to expound our viewpoints and attitudes and to acquaint the people of the real situation in the country as we conceive it; simultaneously urging sincere citizens to speed up their efforts and conquer all obstacles to enable either party fulfill its obligations and responsibilities.

Likewise, we do wish that our brothers in the KDP follow suit and tell the people of the commitments and duties they had accomplished in respect to the Manifesto, which they had supported and adopted. Meanwhile, we do want to hear, and to have the people informed, of what the KDP and the Kurdish Movement think we are required to carry out of the Manifesto's stipulations today, or tomorrow.

Whatever the attitude of the KDP might be, the March Manifesto, in the conviction of the ABSP

and the revolutionary authority, constitutes a commitment of principle and a policy that conforms to the total sum of the liberating, progressive and revolutionary line followed by them in leading the country.

The responsibility and commitment of the KDP towards the Manifesto can be judged by the role it plays, and intends to play in future, in its capacity as a partner in the political power, in the interest of the national cause of the Kurdish people and in the interest of the entire country.

Below is a list of the commitments and duties pertaining to the Manifesto which, we believe, have been carried out by the government of the Revolution and by the ABSP:

1. Amending the Interim Constitution to affirm the national presence of the Kurds in accordance with the March Manifesto.
 2. Taking legal measures to ensure the recognition of the Kurdish language, side by side with Arabic, as an official language in the areas where the majority of the population is Kurdish. (The Kurdish language has already become the language of instruction in these areas.)
 3. Participation of Kurdish brothers in the government, public posts and in planning boards.
 4. Appointment of Kurdish officials in the administrative units inhabited by a majority of Kurds, or by citizens mastering the Kurdish language.
 5. Passing out new regulations for the Directorate of the Kurdish Scholastic Affairs as part of effecting comprehensive changes in the Directorate so as to make it competent of discharging its responsibilities.
 6. Renaming schools after historic, geographical and patriotic Kurdish names.
 7. Providing public libraries and schools with Kurdish books.
 8. Appointment of large numbers of teachers in schools where teaching is conducted in Kurdish.
 9. Creation of a Directorate for Kurdish Culture in the Ministry of Information.
 10. Establishment of al-Tadhamon Kurdish Printing and Publishing House.
 11. Publishing of a Kurdish magazine "Bayan" and a Kurdish newspaper "Hawkari" by the Ministry of Information.
 12. Permitting the publication in Kurdish language newspapers and magazines, such as "Brayati" "Berino", "Shams Kurdistan" and "Estera".
 13. Increasing Kurdish programs at the Kirkuk TV Station.
 14. Licensing the Kurdish Cultural Society
 15. Founding the Union of Kurdish Writers
 16. Permitting the formation of exclusively Kurdish students, youth, women and teachers organizations.
 17. Reinstating students who were dismissed, or compelled to leave school, because of violent conditions to their former schools and institutes, regardless of age restrictions.
 18. Pardoning all prisoners (civilian and military) convicted by competent courts on account of the incidents of the North.
 19. Appointment of teachers and dressers graduating from non-regular courses.
 20. Reinstatement to the service of all Kurdish workers, officials and employees (civilian and military alike) without abdicance with the cadre restrictions and regardless of the extent of their contribution to the acts of violence in the Kurdish area.
- In addition to this, special orders were issued by the President of the Republic and by his Deputy reinstating, as an exceptional case, a large number of military and civilian personnel, despite the lack of any relation between their cases and the incidents of the North. This was in response to the personal wishes of the KDP and Mr. al-Barzani.
21. Allotment of pensions to the families of the martyrs and the victims of the regrettable

incidents of the North and payment of their salaries as from May 1971.

22. Exonerating all Kurdish military men, who deserted the service because of the incidents of the North, from responsibility for the weapons, equipments and supplies that were in their custody.

23. Exempting all Kurds who had participated in the incidents of the North from both conscription and cash payment in lieu of that.

24. Appointment of 6,000 demobilized Peshmargas as frontier guards in 12 regiments. A special law was enacted, considering them as part of the Iraqi armed forces.

25. Allocation of 50,000 Dinars monthly to 5,000 demobilized Peshmargas (ID. 10 each per month) pending absorbing them in suitable jobs.

26. Allocation of between 30-50 thousand Dinars, monthly, to the headquarters of Mr. Al-Barzani.

27. Counting the worker's period of absence from duty, during the fighting, towards pension and social security. The period of absence of the officials and employees, both civilian and military, who participated in the incidents, was also counted towards increment, promotion and pension.

28. Passing a special resolution regarding the Kurdish farmers, which failed to settle their debts to the agricultural bank because of the incidents of the North?

Vide this resolution, they can be granted extra new loans (not restricted by the ordinary ceiling), which are sufficient to enable them to settle their old debts and resume their agricultural activity.

29. Commencing agrarian reform in the Northern area despite the obstructions placed in its way. Agricultural and livestock projects have also been accomplished.

30. Drawing up the economic plan (centrally and self-financed) in a pattern ensuring the balanced development of the Iraqi backward regions, taking into consideration the standard of backwardness in the Kurdish area.

31. Formation of the North Development Committee, which was furnished with adequate funds for accomplishing projects that ensure compensating the Kurdish area for the damages it suffered during the past years. (This is over and above the projects approved in the economic plan.)

32. Completion of many projects, especially in the field of housing and services, to compensate the area for the damages and backwardness it sustained. 12,000 houses were built for those who lost their homes during the lamentable hostilities. Many primary and secondary schools, public clinics, health centers and hospitals were opened. Artesian wells were sunk, modern markets were established and many water and electricity projects were accomplished.

Quite a number of tourist and summer resorts projects were constructed. Recently, approval was given for the establishment of a one-million-Dinar tourist grand hotel at Salah Addin.

33. Regarding the industrialization of the Kurdish area, five manually operated carpet-weaving centers have been established in Arbil, Kwaisinjak, Rawndous, Dohuk and al-Amadiya. A center for producing wool threads has been built in Arbil. A dairy produce factory has been developed in Arbil and the building of the Arbil carpentry factory has also been completed. The building of a beets sugar mill in Sulaymaniah will soon be completed. The Sarchinar cement factory will be expanded shortly.

A tobacco-blending factory in Sulaymaniah and a poultry farm in Arbil will soon be accomplished.

Furthermore, work is to begin soon on building a wool textile mill in Arbil, a Kurdish dressmaking plant in Dohuk, a big canning factory in Hareer, a tomato paste plant in Dohuk and a factory for improved cigarettes in Arbil. The Ministry of Oil is soon to begin building fuel depots in Sarchinar to cater for the Northern area, particularly the Governorate of Sulaymaniah.

with various kinds of fuel. A project for processing marble in Arbil will shortly be presented to the Planning Board.

It is common knowledge that the geographical distribution of the development projects, both centrally and self-financed, clearly shows that the per capita share of the projects in the North is higher than the national per capita share.

Ath-Thawra
October 18th. 1972

ON THE ABSP-KDP RELATIONSHIP SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM IN IRAQ

Discussion and documents on the peaceful and Democratic settlement of the problem

Article 3
October 19th, 1972

ON THE ABSP-KDP RELATIONSHIP

One of the important points in the March Manifesto and the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish problem was the question of relationship between the ABSP and the KDP. At the time of the declaration of the Manifesto this relation was termed an "alliance". The maintenance of close relations between the two parties is a natural matter, necessitated by numerous factors: The ABSP is the party that leads the political power; and it was the ABSP, stemming from its doctrines and the resolutions of its national and regional conferences, that got moving, together with the revolutionary authority, in the direction of attaining a peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question.

On the other side, the KDP is regarded as the main force in the Kurdish Armed Movement, which, together with the KDP, is headed by Mr. Mustafa al-Barzani. Negotiations for settling the Kurdish question took place between the two parties. Accordingly, both parties now stand before their masses, and before the entire people, responsible for the implementation and the safeguarding of the Manifesto.

Moreover, the prevalence of close cooperation between the two parties constitutes an important stride along the path of founding a 'National Front' in Iraq. The ABSP firmly believes in, and ceaselessly works for, the establishment of this front. The KDP also advocates building a National Front, but what does the alliance between the ABSP and the KDP mean? What are the basic rules that govern this alliance? What are its limits? And what is its role in the nationalist and progressive National Front?

These questions were posed and discussed during the dialogue that passed between the two parties, prior to the declaration of the March Manifesto. But we must admit that they were not thoroughly scrutinized and that no clear-cut agreement was reached about them. The enthusiastic atmosphere that encompassed the dialogue contributed to the failure in reaching a specific agreement on these questions. The predominant spirit of confidence and of teamwork, inspired by the will of the peaceful and democratic settlement, was considered capable enough of interpreting and defining these and many other issues. But what came to pass during more than two and a half years was, in fact, far from these assumptions.

The relationship between the two parties, which had been termed as an "alliance", went through different stages. At times there prevailed useful and fruitful cooperation. At others, there were disagreements that reached, in certain cases, a high degree of sharpness. Now confidence between the two parties has weakened to the extent that requires both of them, in their own interest and in the interest of the homeland, to work out distinct principles and criteria to govern their mutual relation.

While entrusted with so grave patriotic responsibilities, it is unbecoming to deceive ourselves, and our own people, by resorting to silence regarding hard realities or by veiling them with clichés that are no longer meaningful in practical life.

For our part, certain fundamental issues, relating to the nature of the relation between the ABSP and KDP, were clear right from the beginning. These issues, which we have elucidated to our brothers of the KDP time and again, are, in our opinion, still valid. They can be summed up as follows:

1. The ABSP, from one angle, is a political party-just like any other political party.

From another angle, it is the party that leads political power in the country. It is in the nature of things that the responsibilities, jurisdictions and relations of any party leading political power are not confined to its private affairs, its members and its supporters. They go beyond this to cover the entire country.

In other words, the party that leads political authority is held responsible, in one-way or another, for every citizen, regardless of his ethnic, ideological, class or political affiliation. It is also held responsible for all national issues. This is what is actually taking place in all countries of the world, irrespective of the nature of their political systems.

2. It follows from the above point that the ABSP, which leads political power in the country, cannot (despite its devotion to its alliance with the KDP and its appreciation of the role and stature of this party among the Kurds) by virtue of its national responsibilities, surrender to the KDP absolute power over the Kurdish people in ideological, political organizational and other fields of authority.

The extent of the KDP's representation of the Kurdish people is determined by the free will of the Kurdish masses, which can be expressed in various familiar ways.

3. Besides, the political power led by the ABSP, by virtue of its national responsibility, is bound to secure legal protection and care to every Kurdish citizen, regardless of the nature of relations between the ABSP and the KDP.

Disputes between the KDP and the leadership of the Kurdish Movement on one-hand and Kurdish individuals and groups on the other are the concern of the involved sides as long as they remain within a purely peaceful and legal context. But the political authority is directly responsible to intervene in any dispute that assumes the form of an armed conflict or that disturbs security and breaks the law; it is required to resolve such a conflict in accordance with the established laws and recognized traditions.

Neither the alliance between the ABSP and the KDP, nor the March Manifesto, binds the authority to side in any disputes or conflicts of the sort. Both the alliance and the Manifesto bind the ABSP and the revolutionary government to protect the Manifesto, the liberating and progressive achievements, the national sovereignty and the established laws against any conspiracy, infringement or abuse committed by either Arabs or Kurds.

The Party and the revolutionary government carry out this responsibility either directly or in cooperation with the KDP and the rest of the nationalist, national and progressive political parties and forces of the country, judging each case on its own merits and in accordance with the jurisdictions of state organs as prescribed by the laws and traditions

By virtue of its responsibilities, and by the nature of the functions of its various organs, the government is empowered to deal directly with any citizen, irrespective of his ethnic, political, class or ideological affiliation. This right does not constitute any violation of the principles of alliance or of cooperation with any political party in the country, however important that party might be and whatever the extent of that alliance and cooperation might be.

Naturally, there exist principles and traditions that govern such affairs. Should it be normal to make consultations regarding the appointment of a minister or a governor, it is neither normal nor essential to initiate, always, consultations between the two parties whenever it is proposed to appoint a sub-district officer, an engineer, a clerk, a policeman or an office boy. If political parties in this country indulged in this field to such an extent they would have become employment bureaus-instead of being a vanguard and guide of the masses in their liberating, progressive and democratic struggle. The March Manifesto was alive to this fact. Clause 4 of the Manifesto says: "In the administrative units populated with a Kurdish majority, government officials shall be Kurds or with a majority, government officials shall be Kurds or other citizens mastering the Kurdish language, provided the required number is available. Senior officials, such as the governor, district officer (Qaimaqam) director etc., shall be appointed. Immediate steps shall be taken to develop state organs in the area, in consultation with the High Committee entrusted with supervising the implementation of this Manifesto, in a way that secures proper implementation and enforces national unity and stability in the area".

4. In our opinion, alliance between the ABSP and the KDP must not preclude the establishment of any friendly relations and cooperation between the ABSP and any Kurdish citizen or any group of Kurdish citizens. In the same way, it should not at all rule out the creation of any cordial relations and cooperation between the KDP and any Arab citizen or any group of Arab citizens. This is necessitated by the nature of the unity of the people, the unity of the homeland, the deep-seated Arab-Kurdish historic relations and by the Arab-Kurdish common interests and objectives. But the basic condition in such relations, which is dictated by the nature of the alliance between the two parties and by their mutual devotion to the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question, is that they should not assume hostile forms against either party and that they should be restricted to patriotic individuals and groups alone.

Sure enough, we can see that the KDP maintained, before and after the Manifesto, relations with numerous Arab parties, groupings and personalities. Such relations should be considered normal as long as they do not adopt a hostile attitude towards the ABSP. Likewise, relations between the ABSP and Kurdish parties, groups and personalities should be looked upon as normal as long as they are not hostile to the KDP.

5. Apparently, the circumstances, which surrounded the declaration of the March Manifesto, together with the term "alliance" used to describe relations between the ABSP and the KDP, have engendered a misunderstanding, which subsequently proved to be quite serious.

It may be recalled that, at the time of the issuance of the March 11 Manifesto, the ABSP was in power, single-handed. Then, the question of the nationalist and progressive National Front was under discussion and dialogue; but it was impeded by difficulties and obstructions. Following the proclamation of the Manifesto, representatives of the KDP joined the government. This situation continued until May 1972, when representatives of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and two national independent personalities also joined the government". During this period, many, especially among the ranks of the KDP, fell into a grave mistake when they envisioned that both the situation and the formula of our alliance meant "dividing" authority between the two parties bestowing the ABSP as "guardian" of the Arabs and the KDP as "guardian" of the Kurds. Upon this error many practical disposals were built, in contradiction to the essence of the alliance, which meant a "national concord" and never the 'division of booty.' Even before participation in the government by other nationalist and national parties and forces, and despite the temptation of the power of a ruling party and the concomitant opportunities for assuming special positions in government and the society, the ABSP has remained, and shall always remain, against isolationism, introversion and individualism. Again, despite its leading role, the ABSP will not, under any circumstances, monopolize popular representation, public posts or public responsibilities.

Government officials were never, and will never be, all Baathists-ABSP members. Even the key posts are not exclusive for Baathists. The criteria for assigning official posts and for relations with government officials will never be on a party basis. Before and after the March Manifesto, and before and after the participation of the communists and the nationals in government, there have always been, and there will always be, non-Ba'athist ministers, under-secretaries, directors-general, chairmen of state organizations, army and police commandants, ambassadors and other senior officials. A genuine vanguard party must very vigilantly guard against any tendency for monopoly.

What applies to the ABSP, which led the Revolution, and which is now leading the government, is supposed to be applicable to the KDP, whatever the role and influence of the KDP amongst the Kurds might be. In addition to the above basic principles and criteria, which must always be abided with, the fact that there are other Arab and Kurdish national and nationalist political parties, forces and elements (which neither belong to the ABSP nor to the KDP) must also be recognized. These parties, forces and elements are entitled for their nationalist rights, which were recognized by the National Action Charter that also specified the principles of their inter-relations and cooperation.

Just because Arabs, Turkmen, Assyrian and other citizens are not all Baathists, it is only fair to assume that Kurdish citizens are not all members of the KDP. Likewise, since the ABSP does not compel citizens to join its ranks and support it and since it does not make the question of its joining and support a factor that determines the fate of citizens and their presence in the homeland. The KDP must adopt the same policy and must avoid making identification with its views and policies a matter that decides the fate of Kurdish citizens in the areas populated by a Kurdish majority.

Coming back to the question of public posts, the line pursued by the ABSP ought to be pursued by the KDP. It is not a must that every Kurd appointed as a minister, ambassador, under-secretary, etc., should be of the members of the KDP. There are also the communist, independent, and highly qualified Kurds, who belong to the entire country, and who must, in no way, be overlooked or deprived from fair participation in all responsibilities.

An important question is representation in legislative, executive, and popular and other

organizations. The March Manifesto guaranteed to the Kurds fair participation in all these institutions, in proportion to their population ratio. As the ABSP does not monopolize representation in these organs, the KDP should not monopolize representing 311 the Kurds therein.

The above are, in our opinion, the basic points of our concept of the relationship between our party and the KDP. Having presented them with full candor and explicitness we would like to accentuate two points:

Firstly, had we erred in the past when applying any of the above-mentioned criteria, we are fully prepared to admit our faults and quite ready to remedy them. Secondly, we are also prepared to listen to any rational and sound view, which is motivated by faith in national unity, by the consolidation of the March Manifesto and the peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish question and by reinforcing the strongholds of the Revolution and its liberating, democratic and progressive gains. From the bottom of our hearts, we do hope that brothers of the KDP will follow suit.

SETTLEMENT OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM IN IRAQ

Article 4

HOW DID "AL TAAKHI" TACKLE THE QUESTION OF THE DIALOGUE?

No two persons in our country can possibly disagree that the Kurdish question is one of the highly complicated issues and that work for its peaceful and democratic settlement is surrounded with various difficulties and impediments, numerous internal and external influences and with disparate, and often conflicting, assiduity. No two persons can rightly disagree that it is by no means easy to search for facts in the principal and secondary circumstances surrounding the Kurdish question. This much we have often stated before-indeed each time we discussed the Kurdish question and the March Manifesto. All those who are directly or indirectly connected with the issue are familiar with this fact.

Clear and concrete as this reality is, it does not at all imply the total absence of definite basic points and distinct essential criteria by which the right road can be explored to arrive at fair judgment and correct conclusions. Once we focus our attention perpetually on basic points, and once we depend upon fundamental criteria, broad vistas will open up to us for comprehension, understanding and final settlement. The other aspects (complex, controversial and troublesome as they might be) will become secondary and soluble in the mainstream of joint action by the ABSP and the KDP, as well as in the joint action through the framework of the nationalist and progressive National Front and through the general march for democratic building and social progress in the entire country.

When we commenced publishing this series, entitled "To Safeguard Peace and Consolidate

National Unity", our chief concern was to accentuate the basic points and fundamental criteria to whose importance we had already referred. But before completing all we wanted to say. "Al-Taakhi" embarked on commenting on the same topic.

Therefore, we preferred to wait until "al-Taakhi" had stated its intention to resume thereafter expounding our viewpoints and to debate what it might have raised in regard to this subject. We sincerely hoped that "al-Taakhi" would pursue a new approach in tackling the issues under discussion but "al-Taakhi", in its latest series, followed the same traditional pattern, which is known to us and to everyone.

With the exception of the concluding article in al-Taakhi's series, published under the headlines: "For the Sake of Peace and National Unity" and "For the Sake of Enforcing the March Manifesto", those articles were generally marked with:

1. Evading, hovering around or understating the importance of the commitments of the leadership of the Kurdish Movement and the KDP vide the March Manifesto. When "al-Taakhi" did touch upon this point, it confined it to "restoration of local administration offices to the areas where no such offices existed, reopening of police posts closed down during the years of fighting, absorption of the former Peshmargas in the Frontier Guards and the handing over of the broadcasting station and some heavy weapons to the authority."

Though these examples are by no means few and absolutely disproportionate to the commitments entrusted vide the March Manifesto to the leadership of the Kurdish Movement and the KDP throughout more than two and a half years (in addition to being incomparable to the commitments honored by the revolutionary authority), "al-Taakhi" knows, before anybody else, that these few examples were, from the outset and until now, void of any substance--as we had observed on previous articles. But we will deal with this again at the right moment.

The Peshmargas who joined the Frontier Guards regiment never carried out any of the normal duties of their profession. On the contrary, they exploited their new "official" status as a shield for committing many practices outside the scope of the rule of law. This situation did not exist only when relations between the two parties were darkened with mists of negativism. It has always prevailed even during the period described by "al-Taakhi" as a model of good relations and fruitful cooperation.

As to the re-opened offices of local administration and police posts, brothers in the KDP and others informed of conditions in the northern area know that these offices do not exercise any of the normal functions of state organs in the areas where there are armed men of the Kurdish Movement. This situation did not surface now; it had existed from the first day these offices were re-opened.

We shall deal with the question of the broadcasting station and the weapons later on.

2. Resorting to a line of justification aimed at washing hands off the commitments to which the Kurdish Movement and the KDP were bound under the March Manifesto, and at laying all the blame for the failure of the Kurdish side on the authority and the ABSP and on "circumstances", "atmosphere", "complications" and other similar phraseology. The faults committed by the Kurdish Movement and the KDP, including very basic and very serious mistakes, were passed off as "mere reactions" to malpractices on the part of the authority.

This line represents, on the one hand, a major political error and contradicts the essence of the March Manifesto, the logic of national unity and the sense of responsibility towards the homeland, its interests and fundamental affairs. Discretions and attitudes might, sometimes, be governed by reactions; but reactions cannot always govern the discretions and attitudes of political parties and movements that have a definite ideological and strategic line.

On the other hand, this line of thinking transforms the question of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish problem from the domain of national commitment on the part of all the concerned patriotic parties to the domain of demands raised by the Kurdish Movement and the KDP and met by the authority. This also conflicts with the role, which the KDP wants to assume in the Kurdish area and in the entire country.

3. The articles of 'al- Taakhi' abounded in diverse sorts of attacks and criticism against the ABSP, its policy, and the way it exercises power, its relations with the masses etc. While intending to deal with these questions in detail some time later, we should like to make some interim remarks now:

a. The ABSP is a democratic revolutionary party.

Therefore, it does not fear criticism. As a matter of fact, it exercises self-criticism before waiting to be criticized by others. Citizens are well aware how often the leaders of our Party had admitted mistakes and demanded their rectification. Those who are familiar with the internal education of our Party, including the leaders of the KDP who receive our internal publications regularly, know the extent of the efforts we are paying to purify the march of our Party and to rid our Party of any adulterations and defects.

b. The ABSP did not inherit power from anyone nor had it remained in power for over four years without justification. It came to power across lengthy political and ideological revolutionary activity amongst the broad rank and file of the masses for nearly 20 years.

The ABSP seized power by an armed revolution.

During more than 4 years, the Party managed to attain liberating, democratic and revolutionary achievements that warrant pride and self-confidence in the path it is following for leading the nation and in its vanguard role among the masses and within the nationalistic movement. Such being its nature, the ABSP will never fear criticism.

c. It is customary for our brothers in the KDP to have recourse to severe criticism of the ABSP and the revolutionary government whenever they were called upon to honor their commitments under the March Manifesto and to fulfill their national commitments in general. This criticism, in certain cases, as in some paragraphs of the last series of 'al- Taakhi', bordered upon down right provocation.

However, we believe that this is not the right way to get to the truth or to enable every party carry out its responsibilities.

As to the question of provocation, we should like to assure our colleague, 'al- Taakhi', that we would never be provokable. We will always stick to our objective attitude in tackling all matters related to the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question proceeding from a deep sense of duty towards the homeland (and towards this issue in particular) and from allegiance to our principles and the line pursued by the Revolution in attaining the liberating, democratic and progressive aims of the masses.

In its 5-article series 'al- Taakhi' dealt with numerous questions, which we will comment on at the right time. It said, in a particular tone, in its second article published on 24.10.1972, that 'The two essential and basic points are: (a) the delimitation of the Kurdish Zone and (b) the application of self-rule and the participation of the Kurdish nationality in power'.

In response to the wishes of brothers in the KDP. We shall try to examine and analyze these two points.

Settlement of the Kurdish Problem in Iraq Delineation of the Self-Rule Zone

Article 5

Ath-Thawra 30.10.1972

One of the basic points of the March Manifesto and the peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish problem is the delimitation of the Zone covered by self-rule.

The ABSP and the revolutionary government recognized the right of the Kurdish people to enjoy self-rule within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, the unity of both the political system and national sovereignty and the unity of the interests and aspirations of the Arab and Kurdish peoples.

This was confirmed in the Manifesto, but the Manifesto did not define the geographical zone to be covered by self-rule.

Nevertheless, the Manifesto did contain distinct bases in this respect. Article 14 says:

"After the proclamation of this Manifesto, necessary measures shall be taken, in consultation with the High Committee entrusted with its enforcement, to unify the governorates and administrative units populated with a Kurdish majority, as shown by an official population census to be carried out later on. The state shall endeavor to develop this new administrative unit and expand the exercising, therein, by the Kurdish people of all their national rights as a surety for enjoying full self-rule. Pending the realization of this administrative unity, coordination of Kurdish national affairs should be undertaken through periodical meetings between the High Committee and the governors of the northern area."

From the above article of the March Manifesto, which the KDP endorsed and recognized as a sound basis for the settlement of the Kurdish question, it is evident that the road to the delimitation of the Self-rule Zone passes through "unifying the governorates and administrative units populated with a Kurdish majority -as shown by an official population census to be carried out in due course".

As to the question of the census, we should like to point out some facts. During the talks that preceded the Manifesto, the representatives of the KDP declared that they did not recognize the legality of the 1965 census, conducted under the Arifite dictatorial regime, pointing out that that census had been guided by racism. We agreed with them upon ruling out that census as a basis for finding out the areas populated with a Kurdish majority. Instead, we proposed depending upon the 1957 census as a basis for the new census scheduled to be carried out after the declaration of the Manifesto.

This meant conducting a new population census in the areas whose Kurdish majority is disputed, provided that any population presence that took place in any of these areas after the 1957 census is not recognized.

After the announcement of the Manifesto, and in the course of the action taken to translate it into a reality, the question of commencing practical measures to delimit the areas populated by Kurdish majority was discussed.

Mr. Murtada Saeed Abdul Baqi, in his capacity as Chairman of the Peace Committee entrusted

with the implementation of the Manifesto, conferred with Mr. Mustafa al-Barzani over the question of census. The latter told Mr. Abdul Baqi that he was not prepared to recognize the results of the proposed census if they indicated that the areas which he took for granted to be Kurdish were not so.

He said literally: "Kirkuk is part of Kurdistan. If the population census shows that the majority of its inhabitants are not Kurds, I will not recognize this. I will not bear, before the Kurds, the responsibility for relinquishing Kirkuk. Maybe this can take place after me"!!

This being the situation, the census became meaningless. Commencing it rather meant the resumption of fighting. Therefore, the Revolutionary Command Council preferred to defer the census and Mr. al-Barzani endorsed the postponement.

In the course of the current talks between the ABSP and the KDP, we presented the following other proposals:

"In view of the obstacles hindering the conduction of a population census, and because of the desire to speed up granting self-rule to the Kurdish-populated areas, we propose the re-arrangement of the administrative partition in the light of national reality as follows:

- a. Creation of national administrative units in the areas populated by Kurds.
- b. Amalgamation of the administrative units populated exclusively by Kurds (governorates, districts and sub-districts) into one administrative area; and this area shall be considered the Zone covered by self-rule.
- c. As to Kurdish nationals living in the mixed areas outside the Self-rule Zone, their cultural and administrative rights, within the areas where they live, shall be guaranteed on a par with the other ethnic groups living in the same units".

This is our stance towards the question of the delimitation of the Self-rule Zone. It originates from the following principles:

1. Belief in the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people.
2. Assuming the pre-requisites for exercising these rights.
3. Recognizing that the practicing of these rights takes place only within the framework of one united homeland, namely, Iraq.

However, we have to state quite frankly that we do not feel that brothers in the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement view the matter from the same angle. This is no illusion. On the contrary, this is the result of many actual practices and real conditions. It is also proved by the internal publications of the KDP. These publications themselves are a very dangerous aspect, because internal indoctrination expresses opinions and attitudes of political parties more openly than does their public information media, which are governed by many circumstances, and considerations that prevent the surfacing of all harbored positions.

To clarify our opinion on this matter more precisely, we quote below this excerpt from an article entitled "What is Self-rule?" carried by "al-Kadir" (the internal theoretical magazine of the KOP), issue No. 14/15 for July/August 1972:

"The central objective of our KDP and the Liberation Movement of our Kurdish people, at the present phase, is the realization and practicing of self-rule.

The March Agreement specified certain measures and steps to draw the landmarks of the road leading to self-rule. But neither the substance nor the general guidelines of self-rule were spelled out in the agreement".

In the same article, we continue to read passage:

This "Self-rule is not a substitute for the Kurdish people's right to self-determination. But the objective realities of the development of the Kurdish Liberation Movement together with the

circumstances and conditions surrounding the Movement, necessitate raising the self-rule slogan, so as to enforce the common struggle against the enemies of the two nationalities".

Now, what are we to make of this preaching?

We believe, one does not need thoughtful analysis and lengthy scrutiny to arrive at this obvious conclusion:

"Self-rule is a central objective in this phase", "Self-rule is not a substitute for self-determination", "The objective realities and the surrounding circumstances and conditions necessitate raising the slogan of self-rule" ...These are indeed the essence of the Kurdish attitude; the rest of the phrases and words are secondary indications, meaning nothing stable and profound. We wish to ask the brothers in the KDP

What is the right for self-determination in your opinion?

As it is well known, the right for self-determination is two-sided:

a. Voluntary union

b. Separation.

To our mind, the KDP identified itself with the first side, namely voluntary union, by endorsing the March Manifesto.

In our opinion, too, this is what is desired by the Kurdish masses.

Now, are we to understand from the sentence "self-rule is no substitute for the right to self-determination" that such a right is to be achieved in phases-the first being self-rule as implied by the sentence reading "The central objective of our KDP and the liberation movement of our Kurdish people, at the present phase, is the realization and practicing of self-rule" and by the other sentence saying "The objective realities of the development of the Kurdish liberation movement, together with the circumstances and conditions surrounding the movement, necessitate raising the slogan of self-rule to enforce the common struggle against the enemies of the two peoples"?

The above quotations from the literature used by the KDP for indoctrinating its members is, on the one hand, more important than anything published by "al-Taakhi" in this respect for the reasons stated earlier. On the other hand, they shed sufficient light on all of the incidents, attitudes and points of view presented by the KDP ever since the proclamation of the March Manifesto. They also illuminate the source of this leadership's concept of the March Manifesto and the ways and means for implementing it as well as its attitude towards its own commitments regarding the implementation of all the clauses of the Manifesto and the restoration of normal life in both the northern area and the entire Iraq and regarding the establishment of self-rule and all its essential local and national institutions. (We will deal with these matters in detail later on.) In addition to all we have said, we reproduce here, by way of example, a large portion of an article published by "al-Kadir" magazine, in the same issue referred to above, under the title: "The Kurds and Kurdistan, Between the Arab Nation and the Arab Countries". This article sheds more light on the perspective of the leadership of the KDP of the subjects under discussion.

Settlement of the Kurdish Problem in Iraq 12+13

THIS IS THE QUESTION

Articles 12 and 13, published on 12th and 13th. November 1973 have been compiled in this single article because they deal with the same subject.

The series recently published by "ath- Thawra ", under the heading "For Preservation of peace and Consolidation of National Unity", aroused widespread interest and anxiety and posed important queries amongst popular quarters in Iraq.

In the pan-Arab and international sphere, those articles also stirred similar concern and questions. Many circles indulged on interpreting their motives and consequences in the light of their own affiliations and commitments. In doing so, they proceeded to various destinations.

For instance, one Lebanese newspaper, basing its story on the visit paid by the President of the Republic to the 5th KDP Branch on the occasion of the blessed Fasting Bairam (Id al-Fitr), wrote: "President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr personally intervened to stop the conflict between the ABSP and the KDP", The newspaper, however, ignored two important points: The first is that President al-Bakr is the Secretary-General of the Regional Leadership of the ABSP.

The second point is that the President's call at the KDP's Baghdad Branch is a traditional courtesy visit paid on every Id (Bairam).

The allegations of the Lebanese newspaper also included a denial of the democratic experiment in Iraq - one of whose glimpses is reflected by the current series of articles published by Ath-Thawra" and "al-Taakhi" on this controversial issue.

Lest there be any misunderstanding, at home or abroad, of the real state of affairs in our country, we deem it necessary to elucidate a number of points. And having said what has occurred to us, we believe it is also necessary to put forward the following important question: What is to be done?

To begin with, perhaps it is better to refer the reader to the opening article of this series in which we explained why we preferred to follow this line of debate and to draw his attention to the subsequent two installments dealing with the essence of the March Manifesto and the reciprocal commitments under its provisions and with our concept of the principles that must govern the relationship between our Party and the KDP.

The reader will also remember that "Al- Taakhi" came up with its replies before we completed our series and that we postponed publishing our views until it finished expounding its case.

As mentioned in article 4 of this series, we found "al- Taakhi's" articles rather disappointing. They were generally marked with "evasion", wandering around or belittling the commitments of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement under the March Manifesto. They followed a line of justification to find excuses for avoiding those responsibilities and for laying the blame on the authority and the ABSP. They also abounded with all sorts of diatribe and criticism against the ABSP, its policy, and the way it exercises power and its relationship with the masses.

All this made us believe that an attempt was underway to provoke us and, consequently, to drive the debate between the two papers outside its positive scope. Thus, we were obliged to stress, quite clearly, that we could not be provoked and that we would stick to our objective course in tackling all questions pertinent to the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question.

It has now become essential to say this: despite the many articles we have published and the serious information we have disclosed, we have neither released all the relevant details nor spoken of other questions that are not less important than the matters we had exposed. Therefore, should it be necessary, or should we have to, we reserve the right to come back to those same questions and to disclose more details and new cases.

The reactions and queries set off by our articles can be summed up in the following points:

1. The serious information we published aroused, amongst faithful patriotic circles, a degree of alarm warranting them to sincerely wonder if the ABSP finds itself in a position necessitating the revision of the

March Manifesto and the doctrinal foundation upon which it had been based.

Although our previous articles have expounded our attitude towards this issue, we might as well reaffirm, in a definite and in unequivocal way, that the attitude of the ABSP regarding the legitimate national rights of the Kurdish people and the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question and, consequently, regarding the March Manifesto is a strategic stand of principle. Therefore, it cannot be affected by temporary influences, however grave they might be. Let Us get this clear: it cannot also be affected by the attitudes and behavior of the KDP and the Kurdish Movement.

Yet, we must admit that the points of principle and the concepts upon which the March Manifesto had been based were not equally deep-rooted and clear in the minds of all citizens. In spite of the fact that all the nationalist and progressive political parties and forces, including the ABSP, had adopted clear-cut attitudes of principle towards the Kurdish question, quite many patriotic and loyal quarters viewed the question from different angles with varying standards of consciousness.

While appreciating that it is the duty of our Party and the other progressive nationalist political parties and forces to strain maximum and continuous efforts for educating the masses on the principles of fraternity and equality between nationalities, we can not help overlooking the fact that dangerous attitudes and conduct, such as those committed by certain quarters in the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement, do harm this noble cause, hamper efforts for education and create isolationist prejudices and malicious reactions.

More serious than that: in such circumstances, matters entwine and intermingle, making it, in many a case, difficult to distinguish (within those showing reactions and effects to the attitudes and conduct previously mentioned) the sincere and honest citizen from that prejudiced and associated with reaction and imperialism. This is an important fact that should, in no way, be underrated. In the circumstances now facing Iraq, this matter assumes an increasing importance, and reaches a serious degree of sensitivity. During the revolutionary social changes now unfolding in the country, during the rage of the fierce battle with the monopolies and the imperialist forces that are backing them, in the ebb of retreat and the advance of the influence of the right and imperialism in the area. . Under such extraordinary state of affairs, there becomes graver the danger of confusing the attitudes of the good and honest people with those of vindictive, reactionary and puppet elements. . There becomes greater the dangers of the possibility of hiding behind excuses having a well-meaning surface but, actually, of wicked intentions and really hostile to the "movement of liberation and progress.

Bearing in mind the concrete conditions facing us now and realizing that it is part of our duty and that of the rest of the nationalist, national and progressive political parties and forces to spare no effort to settle matters in the interest of national unity and the movement of liberation and progress. . We believe that the greater part of this responsibility lies on the shoulders of brothers in the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement. As they advocate the national rights of the Kurdish people, they should be fully aware of the concrete conditions in the country where they live and of the volume of reactions created by their attitudes and ways of conduct.

Certainly, the cause of the national rights of any people living with others in one country can never be served or made attainable by rough courses created by attitudes and behavior similar to those mentioned earlier. The attainment of such a goal requires not only initiatives by the political parties concerned and actions by the authority, but also a firm belief amongst all ranks of citizens and a sound psychological mood enriching relations between all citizens of the same homeland.

2 The alarming information we had published on the conditions in the northern area and the attitudes and

disposals of the KDP re-staged on the political theatre a question that used to be posed before the declaration of the March Manifesto regarding the use of cooperation and accord with the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement.

After the declaration of the Manifesto, that same question reflected doubts as to the soundness of the Manifesto as a political step. In the opinion of wondering quarters, including well-meaning sections, the Manifesto will amount to nothing but just one more truce, like those often sought in the past by the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement to secure certain benefits and revert to their previous practices whenever new opportunities occurred.

These quarters found in the information we published grounds and evidence supporting their point of view. Their voices rang louder after having faded for a time as a result of some of them reconsidering their previous conclusions.

As stated in the previous point, in the whirlpool of events, appraisals and analyses made on bona fide bases came to be confused with those stemming from viciousness and association with imperialist and reactionary scheming.

Some quarters have even beaten the drums of war!

Our reaction to all that was restricted to reaffirming that the March Manifesto did not only represent a sound principled and strategic position but also a realistic concept of matters. The positions taken up by the KDP and the Kurdish Movement, extremely serious and grave as they might be, can not at all change this fact. The March Manifesto in essence, is not a contract concluded by the ABSP and the revolutionary authority on the one hand and the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement on the other hand, thus remaining valid as long as relations between the two parties remained good and automatically falling null and void when those relations become bad. The March Manifesto is a political solution of principle to the Kurdish question-formulated by the ABSP and the authority of the revolution. The fact that it has been associated, in the timings and procedures, with the agreement with the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement was due to two considerations:

The first was the genuine desire to spare the country the state of strife and fighting and to save all efforts for carrying out the nationalist, progressive and, also, the nationality tasks.

The second was the realistic appreciation of the role played by this leadership within the ranks of the Kurdish Movement.

But, in our opinion the role of the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement inside the Kurdish Movement, and, indeed, in the national life of Iraq, is not a static and final state. It is a mobile state impersonalized in given conditions, attitudes and positions, should this be also maintained by the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement, its role will continue to be associated with the Manifesto, and a positive factor therein.

Otherwise, this leadership will have to confront a state of being alienated from both the Kurdish movement and the national life.

In all cases, the question to be asked does not center on the soundness of the Manifesto from a political viewpoint, but rather on the nature and volume of the role played by the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement in implementing the Manifesto. Since the March Manifesto is a new formula that is different from previously concluded armistices, the ABSP and the revolutionary authority will remedy problems that crop up during its implementation with new ways and means-altogether different from past methods.

3. Besides questioning once again the soundness of the March Manifesto as a political stance-which we reviewed, and on which we expounded our distinct and clear-cut viewpoints -there surfaced again another query, which ran -as follows: "Knowing, as you do, all these facts about the composition of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement and about the relations between some important elements of these organizations and the ruling reaction in Iran plus reactionary forces at home and elsewhere in the region, how durst you conclude an agreement with them? ...And cooperate with them? . Were these facts not known before the declaration of the March Manifesto?"

This is our answer: "We were aware of these facts prior to the announcement of the Manifesto; and we have frankly discussed them with our brothers in the KDP in the course of the dialogue that preceded the Manifesto. The analysis worked out and agreed upon by us and the rest of the nationalist political parties and forces held this: agreement with the leadership of the KDP (within the framework of a comprehensive peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question, joint national action and the reinforcement of the liberating progressive and democratic struggle of the entire country) would provide objective conditions for alienating the reactionary and suspect elements in the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement who pretend to sympathize with the Kurdish cause and would also create a favorable climate enabling the trimming off of the internal alliances of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement inside both the Kurdish nationality and the whole of Iraq together with breaking off their relations with ruling Iranian reaction.

As a matter of fact, when reaching an agreement with the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement, it was never our intention to create a situation where reactionary pockets within both of them, together with elements- associated with Iran and other reactionary states and imperialistic quarters, can have a semblance of legality under the banner of the March Manifesto. Nor was it our intention to move them from their positions within the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement to positions within the framework of the state and the Revolution under the cloak of the Kurdish people's participation in power!!

Prior to the March Manifesto, and since its declaration, we have made it clear to brothers in the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement that the conditions of peace and the democratic settlement of the Kurdish question must be taken as a historic opportunity for re-arranging the positions of numerous elements and pockets in a way ensuring their renunciation of obstructing and contradicting the national movement of the Kurdish people and the ideals of the Revolution, without which there could not have been a March Manifesto.

Accordingly, we, and the state's "sensitive" organs, refuse to provide such pockets and elements with a cover of legality and protection under the cloak of the national rights of the Kurdish people at a time when the Revolution is taking a firmly resolute stand against similar elements among Arabs and other countrymen. Time and again we talked the matter over, making it clear to them that we understand the national rights of the Kurdish people as a question of a liberal and progressive essence. As such we recognize them and work for their fulfillment, flatly refusing to recognize any representative of the Kurdish people who does not answer patriotic and progressive specifications.

While recognizing the soundness and the legitimacy of the right of the Kurdish people to participate in all walks of life in the country, and while striving for the attainment of these rights, it does not follow that there should be within the country two policies and two orientations towards certain major issues-such as the struggle against colonialism and reaction and their pillars in the region, the building of close relations with the progressive forces in the Arab homeland and the rest of the world and with the socialist countries particularly the Soviet Union. Regarding such issues, there should be one policy and one orientation,

specified by the Revolution within the framework of the 'national alliance', which, in turn, should be a liberating, progressive and revolutionary coalition.

This relative important point must be clarified: In dealing with such matters, we do not stick to the letter of the criteria that prevailed prior to the March Manifesto.

Rather, we stick to the criteria brought about by the new conditions -by the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question, the national alliance and by the escalation of the struggle for liberation and progress.

This is because abnormal situations tend to create abnormal conditions and abnormal consequences.

Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider the situation as soon as a normal climate prevails. This rule applies with equal validity to our relations with other political forces, such as the Communist Party, for example. Under former circumstances, and indeed in the initial stages of the Revolution, certain progressive forces raised the slogan of overthrowing the regime; some of their wings even took up arms against the Revolution, causing bloodshed. This compelled the Revolution to take very drastic deterring measures.

But the state of collision and the tensions it leaves behind cannot be made applicable to all conditions and circumstances, particularly when new conditions and formulas ensue. The type of passive relations and the state of affairs that existed in the past between the Communist Party and us do not represent, now, a hindering factor impeding the building of genuine cooperation under altogether new conditions and in utterly new tasks.

4. We must admit that the experience of the relations between the ABSP and the KDP since the issuance of the March Manifesto, due to the grave atrocities committed by certain elements of the KDP and to the strange attitudes directed by those elements against the core of our Party and the core of the Revolution's authority, has created bitterness in the hearts of no few members and cadres of our Party. We cannot hide the fact that many of these members and cadres have lost a good deal of their zeal for fostering relations between the two parties and for the implementation of the provisions of the Manifesto in the best and speediest way. Nor can we conceal the fact that a mood of this kind must leave its imprint on the entire national relations in the country -at least to a certain degree.

Extensive and incessant efforts have been, and still are, exerted by the leadership and the senior cadres of the Party for inculcating in the ranks of the party a thorough understanding of the doctrinal motives upon which the March Manifesto is based, for restraining and rectifying improper reactions, for disseminating sound and wise orientations and for displaying a high sense of responsibility and strict compliance with the Party's strategic line.

This matter might appear as if it was our own headache and, as such, we are alone held responsible for remedying it. Indeed, so it is. But it must be viewed with the concomitant fact that the ABSP is the Party that stands at the helm of power and that its cadres and members shoulder responsibility in many sensitive posts within the state and the mass and professional organizations. Therefore, the feebleness of their enthusiasm for any affair does not inflict loss on the Party alone but also on the entire country.

Is it not a pity that we find ourselves called upon to pay extraordinary efforts in matters that are supposed to have been done with long ago? Such efforts ought to have been spared for dealing with so many and so grave liberating, progressive and democratic tasks on both national and nationalist levels.

However, in spite of all the difficulties that confront us, we are required to live up to our principles and our responsibilities before the people and history, by always marching along the right path -the path of revolutionary and progressive struggle -however dearly the cost and however hard the task might be.

The above is a glance at the reactions we felt at the time of publishing this series. They are not all brand new: some were entertained before the running of our articles by those who knew a certain degree of the

realities of the situation.

Apart from this, there were and still are the reactions originating from the imperialist and reactionary camp. Their main characteristic is having a double-face -the exaggerated and, naturally, suspect concern for the national rights of the Kurdish people on the one hand and the fomentation of tendencies for isolationism as well as hostility to the Kurdish people among the Arabs on the other hand. Although we do not underestimate these reactions, yet we did not deal with them in detail, because their intentions and ways and means are obvious and because the rank and file of our people, of our party and of the other nationalist, national and progressive political parties and forces are mature enough to expose, encounter and fight them.

One might ask: Were you surprised by those reactions?

And how come you to embark on publication without taking them into account?

Our answer is this: We did anticipate those reactions.

When starting our series, we were fully appreciating its concomitant reactions and consequences.

But, we were convinced that the extent of the deterioration in the relations between our party and the KDP, coupled with the alarming degree reached by the behavior and attitudes of the brothers of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement, did not at all permit any more concealment of facts from the people- however bitter and alarming those facts might be. Further, we were fully convinced of the futility of keeping the issue confined to bilateral meetings and discussions. Thus is why we decided to present the problem for the widest possible debate. As a matter of fact we have explained our reasons in the beginning of the first article of this series.

Nor did we stop short at that limit. We proposed to brothers in the KDP that representatives from the Communist Party and from the nationalist and the national progressive forces and elements join our dialogue.

While fully appreciating the concomitant reactions and results of our articles, we had to adopt this style of projecting facts neither for provocation or defamation nor for breaking off relations or for justifying such an action.

As a matter of fact, we had to resort to this pattern of information while the dialogue between the ABSP and the KDP was in its preliminary stages.

Before publishing our series, and in the course of the dialogue between the two parties, the Regional Leadership of the ABSP addressed a detailed memo to the leadership of the KDP. * We had to send that memo in spite of being previously told by brothers in the KDP that they were not in favour of the exchange of memos and that they preferred direct talks. We did so because we preferred communication through notes so that matters may be well defined and specific and lest the truth be lost in the welter of verbal debate.

The Central Committee of the KDP's reply to our memorandum, which was published in "al-Nahar" newspaper of Beirut before reaching us, is now being studied and we shall state our views about it in due course.

From the facts and viewpoints previously stated, one can perceive our intention from making facts known to the people on the widest possible range, regardless of any negative outcome that might arise from disseminating the truth. We were motivated by the conviction that acquainting the public opinion with all facts enables it pass a fair judgement on our own attitudes and conduct and that of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement. We also meant to transfer the controversy from the narrow margin represented by the dialogue between the two parties to a national public scope with the aim of elaborating the peaceful solutions to the matters under study and of mobilizing the broadest massive forces to

safeguard peace and cement national unity.

This should not infer that we suspend disagreements in a vacuum. Far from this, we have a thorough analysis of the situation and its remote and close eventualities. We did explain to brothers in the KDP our concept of the roads leading to the creation of sound cooperation between our party and the revolutionary regime on the one hand and the leadership of the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement on the other hand. This concept may be summarized in the following:

1. The Application of the principle of the supremacy of law and the constitutional institutions of the state, together with the prohibition of any exercise of power outside competent constitutional and judicial state institutions.

2. The relationship between the ABSP and the revolutionary authority on one side and the KDP on the other must be governed by the basic interests of the Revolution and its forces; it must not be achieved at the expense of undermining ties with any progressive force, category, or group backing the Revolution in the northern area. The reason is that the Revolution does not accept to curtail its commitments towards the Kurdish people or to reduce them to a one-sided relation maintained only with the KDP. Generally speaking, no political party can be a substitute for the people, though it can prove, by deeds, to be their vanguard.

3. The KDP must undertake to sever relations with the ruling Iranian reaction, to seal the borders and to hand over the frontier posts to the army.

4. The KDP must undertake to cease animosity against Iranian patriots and give up handing over Iranian fugitives to the authorities of the Shah.

5. The KDP must undertake to break with the reactionary and suspect elements that are hostile to the Revolution and to give up maintaining dual relations simultaneously with the Revolution and its enemies. Condemning political assassination and classifying all crimes that break the peace as extra-ordinary crimes-well outside the boundaries of routine offences.

Condemning and fighting against all deeds and practices that lend justification to the activities of the chauvinist and isolationist elements aimed at inciting disorder and sedition.

Giving up endeavors for winning over the reactionary and for imposing their domination over the masses and abiding in political relations by the principles of revolutionary democratic struggle.

Banishment of Kurdish chieftains who constitute a danger to the peace in the northern area to Baghdad or to any other town. Alternatively, appropriate conditions must be assured to enable them live in their homes, meanwhile subjecting to trial anyone who breaks the law or order, or who attempts at instigating quarrels or sedition.

The KDP must undertake not to encounter the armed forces discharging their duties, and not to encounter the security and intelligence organs operating in the northern area, because such atrocities can emanate only from a mentality of detachment from the authority and of fighting against it, in addition to being inconsistent with the spirit of the March Manifesto.

The KDP must undertake not to assault elements supporting the Revolution, not to kidnap, torture or kill citizens and to close down all KDP's prisons and concentration camps together with setting free all inmates.

The KDP must acknowledge the fact that agreement with it on solving the Kurdish question neither means neither its monopoly of all state organs in the northern area nor its monopoly of representing the Kurdish people in the main organs of the state.

The practical policy of the KDP should be steered in the course of cementing peace and national fraternity and safeguarding national unity and the unity of struggle.

It is impossible to tolerate the perpetuation of the KDP's policy that is based solely on its private interests in detachment from the country's basic interests. Nor is it possible to relegate the country's basic interests to a second-class status.

All administrative staff labeled as KDP members must enforce the laws and regulations of the country and must create conditions assuring the unity of national sovereignty.

The KDP must undertake to prevent the state of armament in the areas inhabited by Kurds and to stop searches carried out on public roads by armed members of the KDP.

The KDP must undertake to provide all the prerequisites enabling the state to conduct investigations in all crimes of assassination and kidnapping. It must also undertake to hand over to competent state organs all elements hostile to the Revolution and to refuse shelter and protection to all criminals, wanted persons or military service dodgers.

The KDP must undertake to proceed along the path of consolidating the gains of the Revolution and to resist counter-revolutionary currents. It is not permissible that the KDP converts its official offices throughout Iraq into shelters for reactionary and counter-revolutionary elements. These elements neither restored peace to the northern area nor are they concerned for the historic March Manifesto.

As such, nothing meaningful justifies the maintenance of a relationship with them.

Agreement should be worked out to remove administrative elements appointed in the northern area on the recommendation of the KDP who proved to be insubordinate to the central authority and who actually refused to carry out the orders of the government.

The resettlement of all Kurds in their former places, regardless of whether they deserted their homes before or after the March Manifesto.

Forbidding KDP's organizations from interfering in the daily affairs of government.

The formation of a judiciary body, enjoying the support of the nationalist forces to be entrusted with investigating accusations of offences endangering the security and safety of the state.

No- obstacles should be placed in the road of implementing the resolutions of the Revolution concerning granting cultural and administrative rights to national minorities.

The enforcement of the Agrarian Reform Law should not be obstructed in any way.

Effective contribution to the prevention of smuggling and the infiltration of foreigners and foreign intelligence elements through the Iraqi northern frontiers.

Handing over heavy arms to the authority.

Settlement of the Kurdish Problem in Iraq 14 BROAD DEMOCRATIC DEBATE INVITED Ath - Thawra November 1973

The Kurdish question is one of the principal issues facing the Iraqi national movement. It is dialectically associated with the progressive and democratic struggle of our people and with their basic interests. It is also connected, in many ways, with the struggle of the entire Arab people against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

Since the triumph of the July 17 Revolution, our Party's efforts to solve this question were always interlinked with the struggle for achieving progressive and democratic tasks and with the struggle for

attaining the fundamental Arab aims, particularly the struggle against the Zionist enemy and its imperialist and reactionary allies.

It is true that the process of embodying, in explicit and comprehensive frameworks and formulas, the link between the Kurdish problem and some other basic issues (specially the question of building a nationalist and progressive "National Front") has taken quite a longer time than the practical steps taken by the Revolution towards settling the problem particularly the announcement of the March 11 Manifesto. But this was not due to either a one-sided view of the Kurdish question or to a desire to keep the matter confined to just two sides. It should rather be attributed to the complicated circumstances that governed relations between all parties of the nationalist, national and progressive movement in our country. Those circumstances necessitated exceptional efforts and a relatively long time to promote relations to the level of a progressive 'Front' guided by a definite and agreed programme of joint action and by genuine and fruitful devices for common cooperation. Perhaps we are not exaggerating if we say that any fair analysis of the essence of the progress of the July 17 Revolution will bear out what we have just said.

Now that we have projected our view to the people and to their nationalist, national and progressive political parties and forces through publishing what information and conclusions we deemed necessary to disclose, concerning relations between our party and the revolutionary authority on the one hand and the KDP and the Kurdish Armed Movement on the other hand and concerning the obstacles coming in the way of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question we believe that the next right step is to open a national debate on the problems under review.

The issues raised in our previous 13 articles are so serious and so critical that they need the participation of all -the political parties, all the nationalist, national and progressive forces, all the thinkers and writers and all the popular and professional organizations, federations and societies- in their debate and in proposing their best solutions. They are, undoubtedly, issues concerning the whole homeland and the whole people. They are not of any private character warranting confining their discussion and disagreement or even agreement upon them to our brothers in the KDP and to us solely.

We appeal to all citizen -political parties, organizations, societies, thinkers and writers- to express their opinion on the issues raised by us. We are ready to publish in this, newspaper, "ath-Thawra", all views received in this respect, including, of course, those, which contradict and disagree with our ideas and views and those, which criticize our deeds and procedures.

We should like, also, to propose to the nationalist organizations to arrange for open discussion circles for this purpose. We are fully confident that such patriotic and free discussions will ensure optimum conditions for tackling the difficulties coming in the way of the peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish question, for the isolation of suspect currents and trends and for consolidating the positions of the bona fide forces that believe in Arab-Kurdish brotherhood and in the progressive and democratic principles of the July 17 Revolution.

Settlement of the Kurdish Problem in Iraq (15)

March 11 Manifesto on the Peaceful Settlement of the Kurdish Issue in Iraq

The primary *raison d'être* of the July 17 Revolution was that it represented both the denunciation by the Arab masses of all causes and causers of the June defeat and the consensus of the popular opinion of Iraq in condemning the former dictatorial reactionary rule for contributing, by its defeatist attitude, to that nationalist ordeal. That was because the former regime was completely isolated from the people and absolutely incapable of solving the national issues that had always gnawed at the root of the national structure and whose settlement was a precondition for determined endeavors to mobilize human and material energies in Iraq and commit them where they belong—in the frontlines of the battle of the destiny of the Arab nation.

This being so, the Revolution laid before its eyes, right from the very first days, the duty of realizing the national unity of the people of Iraq without any discrimination on account of sex, language, religion or social origin, side by side with assuring all political, social and economic conditions required for this unity. In this way, it should be possible for Iraq to direct all of its energies and possibilities to the nationalist battle of destiny which, in the opinion of the Revolution, represents the summit of the bitter historic strife between colonialism, Zionism and their evil designs in the Arab homeland on the one hand, and the interests of the liberation of the Arab nation and its struggle for the achievement of its human progressive aims on the other.

In spite of the legacy of myriad, complicated problems which confronted the Revolution from the day of its inception, the Revolution proceeded with firmness and faith up the road of liberating Iraq from the residues of colonialism, national betrayal and political and social oppression and for providing all prerequisites to build a new Iraq, where actual equality in rights and obligations and equal opportunities shall effectively be established and wide horizons shall be opened to the masses of the people by means of collective loyalty to the unity of the homeland, to the unity of its people and to the unity of its major goal—nationalist unity, liberty and socialism.

The settlement of the Kurdish issue in Iraq stood in the forefront of the national issues, which the Revolution faced. This was particularly so as the incapability of the former regimes to comprehend that issue, even the lack of a genuine desire to tackle it and suggest proper solutions to it in those eras, side by side with the concomitant exploitation of the resulting circumstances by imperialism, its collaborators and its agents, have all combined to further complicate the issue to the extent of rendering it something akin to forbidding and insoluble. The situation had further been aggravated as a result of the substitution of violence for brotherly and objective democratic dialogue, which is required by the nature of this national issue and the legitimate and just rights it involved for a section of the Iraqi people.

From its very first days, the Revolution proceeded to deal with this national issue in an atmosphere permeated with a sense of self-responsibility and with the highest degree of adherence to democratic and revolutionary principles.

The Revolution, which is inspired by the theoretical fountainhead of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, believes that nationalist rights are, in their essence, democratic rights. They have, among their aims, reviving the cultural heritage, language and tradition, as well as putting free will into practice. The consolidation of such rights among various nationalities, particularly those of the same homeland,

requires the realization of ways and means for organizing relationships between those nationalities in a manner conducive to their collective uplift.

Any plan aimed at undermining ties between them or sowing the seeds of dissension can be of no service to their collective interests.

Meanwhile, the organisation and cementation of national and human ties between them and steering such ties to the service progress, will systematically assure the means of the unity of national life in an atmosphere abounding in national fraternity and peace.

Imbued by these principles, the Seventh Regional Conference of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, which convened late in 1968 and early in 1969, took steps to delineate the Party's ideological and theoretical positions on this national issue and chart out a settlement of the issue for the Revolution and the revolutionary authority. The resolutions passed by that Conference had this to say, among other things: "The Conference has stressed the conviction that the question of the nationalist ambitions of the Kurds of Iraq comes in the forefront of the problems facing the Arab revolutionary movement. Years have now passed by without arriving at a sound settlement of this issue.

Consequently, unspeakable calamities and tragedies came to be inflicted on both Arabs and Kurds as a result of arbitrariness in approaching the issue. The forces of imperialism and reaction and the detachments of agents and opportunists readily put the situation to their own advantage and used the failure of solving the issue as a vehicle for meddling in Iraq's affairs, bringing pressure to bear on it, spinning conspiracies on the rights of both Arabs and Kurds and inflicting the greatest possible damage on the progressive and democratic nationalist gains they had won at a high cost of self-sacrifice and common struggle."

The Conference further stressed that our Party which, in its militant struggle and policy always stemmed from its nationalist humanistic, socialist and democratic ideology, has consistently held in high respect the national ambitions of the Kurdish masses as embedded in their own progressive national substance and view them as legitimate humanistic rights. The Conference well appreciated the strong ties between the realization of those ambitions and the vigor and soundness of the advance of the popular masses in Iraq up the road of liquidating the legacies of colonialism so as to have Iraq's hand free for engaging in the current battle of destiny in Palestine and keeping up the historic struggle for the achievement of Arab unity, liberty and socialism.

The Revolution, sincere to the principles and resolutions of the Party, has recognized for the Kurdish citizens their entitlement to their national rights and to developing their national characteristics within the framework of the unity of the people and the homeland and the country's constitutional system.

As the Arab nation is engaged in a large scale conflict with imperialism, Zionism and local reaction-a conflict placing it in the frontline of the struggle of the peoples of the Middle East, (it being understood that the struggle of the people of Iraq is closely linked with the struggle of the Arab nation for democracy and for combating the forces of reaction on both world-wide and local levels)-the Revolution considers that the first prop of Arab-Kurdish national unity in Iraq lies in the fact that Kurdish national unity, like its Arab counterpart, is a democratic movement directed against the same forces of reaction. In Iraq, it is tied up to the Arab liberation movement by the unity of struggle against imperialism and its reactionary allied forces. It is also tied up to the struggle of the Arab people by the traditions of historic fraternity, the unity of economic interests and the concerted evolution of the Arab and Kurdish nationalities. Any breach of this harmony will, of necessity, inflict immense damage on the common struggle and on the progressive national resurgence in general.

Imperialism has long realized that the unity of the Arab-Kurdish struggle has the effect of reinforcing the

Arab-Kurdish liberation movement and enabling it to occupy important positions in the face of the imperialistic-Zionist-Israeli aggressive scheming in the region, particularly in regard to the national battle of destiny currently raging in Palestine and the surrounding Arab countries. As such, the imperialistic and hireling quarters have been trying madly to break cohesion and fraternity between the Arab and Kurdish masses with the purpose of undermining the front of the revolutionary national struggle of Iraq. The Revolution, understanding the national issue as an integral part of the revolution struggling against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, will necessarily abide, in every step taken towards settling the Kurdish national issue, by the measures conducive to cementing and consolidating the national and the nationalist struggles against those inhuman forces combined.

From this it follows that the exercise by the Kurdish masses of their national rights and the achievement of equal opportunities for free development constitute the two paths leading to the unification and cementation of Iraq's national struggle against the enemies of the people and the enemies of the Arab nation and of the people of Iraq, namely imperialism; Zionism and reaction.

It was by no means a coincidence that the imperialistic-Zionist-reactionary conspiracies against the Republic of Iraq occurred at a time when signs of peace began looming large on the horizon of our beloved North, thanks to the meaningful endeavors exerted by the Revolutionary Government and the sincere response on the part of the leadership of Sd. Mustafa Al-Barazani.

It is public knowledge that the Revolution had taken all necessary measures for the re-establishment of calm and peace throughout northern Iraq. The following steps have been taken:

A) Recognition has been given to the legitimacy of the Kurdish nationality, this being in accordance with the Resolutions of the Seventh Regional Conference of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and the official and press statements issued by the revolutionary authority. This fact shall be enshrined in a lasting manner in the Interim Constitution and the Permanent Constitution.

B) The Revolutionary Command Council has approved the establishment of a university in Sulaimaniyah and the establishment of a Kurdish academy of letters. It has also recognized the cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurdish nationality, prescribing that the Kurdish language be taught in all schools, institutes and universities, teachers training institutes, the Military College and the Police College. The Revolutionary Command Council further prescribed the wide dissemination of Kurdish literature-scientific, literary and political-expressive of the national and nationalist ambitions of the Kurdish people. It ordered measures to be taken to help Kurdish authors, poets and writers to form a federation of their own, get their works printed and afford them all opportunities and possibilities for developing their scientific and artistic talents. The Revolutionary Command Council also ordered arrangements to be made for founding a Kurdish publishing and printing house and a directorate general of Kurdish culture, the publishing of a weekly newspaper and a monthly magazine in Kurdish and expanding Kurdish programmes on the Kirkuk TV Station, pending the construction of a TV station broadcasting exclusively in Kurdish.

C) In recognition of the rights of the Kurds to revive their traditions and national days and to make it possible for the whole of the people to join in the observance of national days, the Revolutionary Command Council has decreed Nawrooz Day as a National Day in the Republic of Iraq.

D) The Revolutionary Command Council has promulgated the Governorates Law, which provides for the decentralization of local administration and for the creation of the Governorate of Dohuk.

E) The Revolutionary Command Council has issued a general amnesty for all civilian and military personnel who had joined in acts of violence in the North so as to do away with all vestiges of former

negative and exceptional conditions and lay the new national life on solid foundations of pervasive security and national fraternity.

The Arab Kurdish masses of Iraq received with acclamation and welcome the acts and measures of the Revolutionary Command Council, thereby setting the stage for proceeding with the realization of the aims which have become the object of popular consensus and on which the will and unity of word of the people came to be centered.

In view of the above, the Revolutionary Command Council established contacts with the leadership of Sd. Mustafa Al-Barazani, Chairman of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and viewpoints were subsequently exchanged. All were convinced of the necessity of accepting and implementing the contents of this Manifesto. The Revolutionary Command Council reiterates its determination to deepen and broaden the effective measures made with the object of achieving the means of cultural and economic uplift and general development, at enabling the Kurdish masses to exercise their legitimate rights and secure their actual participation in the national build-up and the struggle for the realization of the great nationalist objectives of the homeland.

The Revolutionary Command Council has thus decreed the following:

1) The Kurdish language shall, side by side with the Arabic language, be an official language in the areas populated by a majority of Kurds.

The Kurdish language shall be the language of instruction in these areas. The Arabic language shall be taught in all schools where teaching is conducted in Kurdish. The Kurdish language shall be taught elsewhere in Iraq as a second language within the limits prescribed by the law.

2) It has been one of the main concerns of the revolutionary government to secure participation by our Kurdish brothers in Government and eliminate any discrimination between Kurds and other nationals in regard to holding public offices, including sensitive and important ones such as cabinet ministries, army commands, etc. While endorsing this principle, the revolutionary government stresses the need of endeavoring to have the principle achieved in fair proportions with due care to considerations of merits, the population ratio and the deprivations experienced by our Kurdish brothers in the past.

3) In view of the backwardness experienced in the past by the Kurdish nationality in the cultural and educational domains, a plan should be worked out for the treatment of this backwardness. This is to be achieved through:

(a) Implementing expeditiously the resolutions of the Revolutionary Command Council in regard to the language and cultural rights of the Kurdish people and tying up the preparation and direction of special programmes on Kurdish national affairs in the radio and TV network to the Directorate General of Kurdish Culture and Information.

(b) Reinstating students who were dismissed or had to leave school because of former conditions of violence in the area. These students should be allowed to return to their respective schools regardless of age limits or else have a convenient remedy suggested for their problem.

(c) Building more schools in the Kurdish area, elevating the standards of education and admitting, at a fair rate, Kurdish students to universities and military colleges and granting them scholarships.

4) In the administrative units populated by a Kurdish majority, government officials shall be appointed from among Kurds or persons well versed in the Kurdish language as long as these are available. The principal Government functionaries-governor, district officer

(Qaimmaqam), director of police, director of security, etc.-shall be drawn from among the Kurds. Steps shall immediately be taken to develop state organs in the area in consultation within the framework of the High Committee supervising the implementation of this Manifesto in a manner insuring its proper

enforcement and consolidating national unity and stability in the area.

5) The Government recognizes the right of the Kurdish people to set up student, youth, women and teachers organizations of their own.

These organizations shall be affiliated in the national counterparts in Iraq.

6) (a) The validity of paras. (1) and (2) of the Revolutionary Command Council's Decree No.59 dated August 5, 1968, shall be extended to the date of the issuance of this Manifesto. This shall cover all of those who took part in hostilities in the Kurdish area.

(b) Workers, government functionaries and employees, both civilian and military, shall go back to service without being subject to cadre considerations. The civilian personnel shall be posted to the Kurdish area within the limits of its requirements.

7) (a) A committee of specialists shall be formed to speed up the uplift of the Kurdish area in all respects and provide indemnities for the affliction of the past number of years, side by side with drawing up an adequate budget for all of this. The committee in question shall be attached to the Ministry of Northern Affairs.

(b) The economic plan shall be drawn up in such a way as to ensure equal development for various parts of Iraq, with due attention to the backward conditions in the Kurdish area.

(c) Pension salaries shall be made available to the families of members of the Kurdish armed movement who met with martyrdom in the regrettable hostilities as well as to those rendered incapacitated or disfigured. This shall be regulated in special legislation patterned on the existing laws of the land.

(d) Speedy action shall be taken to bring relief to aggrieved and needy persons by means of building housing units and other projects ensuring work to the unemployed, offering appropriate aid both in kind and in cash and granting reasonable indemnities to aggrieved persons who stand in need for help. This shall be the responsibility of the High Committee, with the exception of those specified in the above paras.

8) The inhabitants of Arab and Kurdish villages shall be repatriated to their places of habitation. As to villagers whose villages lie in areas requisitioned by the Government for public utility purposes in accordance with the provisions of the law, they shall be settled in neighbouring districts and shall be compensated for whatever loss they might have incurred as a result.

9) Steps shall be taken to speed up the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Kurdish area and have the Law amended in such a way as to ensure the liquidation of all feudalistic relationships, handing out appropriate plots of land to all peasants and waiving for them agricultural tax arrears for the duration of the regrettable hostilities.

10) It has been agreed to amend the Interim Constitution as follows:

(a) The people of Iraq are composed of two principal nationalities:

the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. This Constitution recognizes the national rights of the Kurdish people and the rights of all nationalities within the framework of Iraqi unity.

(b) The following paragraph shall be added to Article (4) of the Constitution: "The Kurdish language, beside the Arabic language, shall be an official language in the Kurdish area."

(c) All this shall be confirmed in the Permanent Constitution.

II) The broadcasting station and heavy arms shall be given back to the Government, this being tied up to the implementation of the final stages of the agreement.

12) One of the vice-presidents of the Republic shall be a Kurd.

13) The Governorates Law shall be part of the text of this Manifesto.

14) Following the issuance of the Manifesto, necessary steps shall be taken in consultation with the High

Committee supervising its enforcement, to unify the governorates and administrative units populated by a Kurdish majority as shown by the official census to be carried out. The State shall endeavour to develop this administrative unity and deepen and broaden the Kurdish people's process of exercising their national rights as a measure of ensuring self-rule.

Pending the realization of administrative unity, Kurdish national affairs shall be coordinated by means of periodic meetings between the High Committee and the governors of the northern area. As self-rule is to be established within the framework of the Republic of Iraq, the exploitation of the natural riches in the area shall obviously be the prerogative of the authorities of the Republic.

15) The Kurdish people shall contribute to the legislative branch in proportion to the ratio they have to the population of Iraq.

Kurdish Countrymen!

These accomplishments achieved by the Revolution are nothing more than a step up the ladder of attaining your national objectives in the shade of this beloved homeland and the unity of its great people. History will bear witness that you never had and never will have as dependable brothers and allies as the Arab people.

Masses of our great people!

It is your will in national unity, which will triumph in the end. All attempts made to undermine your militant cohesion shall get smashed up on the rock of your maturity and your determination to live up to your historic responsibilities. Your struggling masses are today shedding off the dust of the intrigues spun by the enemies and greedy elements and are proceeding hand in hand vigorously and resolutely for backing up the cause of the Arab nation, namely Palestine, and realise your sublime objective in respect to unity, liberty and socialism.

Masses of our struggling Arab Nation!

A page of the history of this struggling country is thus folded out and a new bright one is opened by the Revolution and by all free militant strugglers of this homeland. On this beloved soil, the bonds of affection, peace and fraternity are rejuvenated between two nationalities that are held together by a long record of common struggle across history. Today, tomorrow and forever, they shall have endless honour across history. Today, tomorrow and for ever, they shall have the honour of reviving a common struggle for vanquishing the enemies of the two nationalities and the enemies of peoples and humanity in its entirety, namely Zionism, imperialism and backwardness. They shall have the honour of a joint contribution to backing up man's struggle for liberation and progress and for consolidating the civilization of the age on foundations of right, equality and justice among all peoples.

Forward for the common struggle, common hopes and common nationalist and human victories!

The Revolutionary Command Council

11/3/1970